首页
法学研究所概况
国际法研究所概况
研究人员
科研成果
学术活动
法学刊物
法学教育
图书馆
工作平台
搜索

 

English

日本語

한국어

Territorial Status and Right to Self-Determination of the Ryukyu Islands
LUO Huanxin
字号:

Territorial Status andRight to Self-Determination of the Ryukyu Islands

LUO Huanxin*

 

Abstract: The right to self-determination is a fundamental principle enshrined by international law as well as an equally important collective human right. What this principle exactly stands for and entails has always been controversial and sensitive. However, despite potential controversy, there has been consensus in a traditional sense that people living in colonial, trust and non-self-governing territories are entitled to the right to self-determination. In the doctrines of law, the right to self-determination is also referred to as the “colonial self-determination”, “traditional self-determination”, or “classical self-determination”. The status of the Ryukyu Islands has been a contentious issue since 1879, when the “Disposition   of Ryukyu” was implemented. In the aftermath of World War II, there was an opportunity to deal with the issue on the Ryukyu Islands. As the U.S. won over     Japan, the 1951 Treaty of Peace with Japan and 1971 Agreement between the United States of America and Japan Concerning the Ryukyu Islands and the Daito Islands established the basis for the aforementioned States to successively share the control of both. The Ryukyu Islands, qualifying as a trust territory, enable its inhabitants to claim the right to self-determination. So that, if the people from the Ryukyu Islands demand independence from their administering States or incorporation into a neighboring State, this demand would not count as an act of as separatism orsplittism.

Key Words: the Ryukyu Islands; Okinawa; Territorial status; Self- determination; Trusteeship

 

Ryukyu is the shorten form of the Ryukyu Kingdom in history, and of the  Ryukyu Islands in geography as well, which are currently under the  administration and control of the Okinawa Prefecture (referred to as “Okinawa” in short), Japan.[1]The Ryukyu Islands are a long chain of islands in the Western Pacific Ocean. Extending southwestward between the Kyushu Islands and the Taiwan Island, they can be divided into Northern, Central and Southern.[2]The Central part is constituted by the Okinawa Islands. Among them, the Okinawa Island is the largest island in    the Ryukyu Islands. The jurisdiction of Ryukyu has changed several times through history. With an area of around 2,270 square kilometers and a population of about

1.3 million, the Ryukyu Islands in a narrow sense are currently under Japanese “domination”.[3]

Consequently, the independence and self-determination of the Ryukyu Islands has long been an issue. In the past, the Ryukyu Kingdom was one of the most          stable and sustained tributary State of China. Because of this history, the Ryukyu Islands possess a unique cultural characteristic and related political autonomous   status. The implementation of the “Disposition of Ryukyu” by Japan in 1879 made its legal status a “mystery”. In 1945, when the U.S. defeated Japan, the Ryukyu Islands could have reverted the loss of its territorial autonomy. Unfortunately, this opportunity went lost: firstly because of the military occupation and administration oftheislandsbytheU.S.;andsecondlybytheadministrationofJapan,whichwas unilaterally authorized by the U.S. in accordance to the 1971 Agreement between   the United States of America and Japan Concerning the Ryukyu Islands and the    Daito Islands (namely “Okinawa Reversion Agreement”). Studies have amply demonstrated that, under World War II’s post-war settlement, the Ryukyu Islands qualify as “potential candidates for trusteeship among territories”. Consequently, Japan, as  the state exercising administrative power at  the present time, lacks  a legitimate basis to exert its sovereignty over the Ryukyu Islands.[4]Currently, the Ryukyu Islands, despite being under Japan’s administration, are still partlycontrolled by the U.S., who has retained a large number of U.S. military bases on them.[5]As a result, the Ryukyuan people are living in the political dilemma between the U.S. and Japan. In fact, the Ryukyuan people have repeatedly protested against the U.S. military bases and, accordingly, issued several calls for self-determination due to the legitimate concerns about the storage of nuclear weapons on such bases and dissatisfaction with the base’s nuisance practices. Important as these concerns are, the unique territorial status of the Ryukyu Islands, rather than the existence of the U.S. military bases, represents the most legitimate ground on which the right to self-determination can be claimedfrom.

Although the right to self-determination is the first collective human right        and the most important fundamental human right recognized by the international community, the subject and mode of exercising this right has been fraught with controversy. Controversy has stemmed from the yet unclear distinction between      the right to self-determination and separatism as well as relationship between the right to self-determination and principles of territorial integrity. Taken together, these two set of issues have furthered the complexity and sensitivity of the matter here discussed. However, when existence of the right to self-determination is clearly distinguished from the political phenomenon of separatism and splittism,  thereisacertainconsensusthatthepeoplewhichliveineithertrustterritoriesor non-self-governing territories that have existed since the colonial period before     World War II have the right to self-determination. Since this consensus amounts to State that the sovereignties of the trust and non-self-governing territories do not belong to their administering or controlling States, the right to exercise self- determination of the former is, by definition, not in conflict with the territorial     integrity of the latter. Their right to self-determination is the most fundamental and indisputable.Thisrighttoself-determination,indoctrine,isalsoknownas“colonial self-determination” or “traditional self-determination”. From this perspective, if      the Ryukyuan people call for a referendum to demand independence from their administering States or incorporation into a neighboring State, this demand would not count as an act of as separatism or splittism.[6]Since there are only a few studies focusing on the territorial status of the Ryukyu Islands in relation to the right to self-determination as defined in international law, this article will focus on such analysis from thisperspective.

 

I. The Right to Self-determination Related to the Territorial Status in Which the PeopleReside

 

The right to self-determination, which is also known as the “right of peoples    to self-determination” or the “right of nations to self-determination”, originated from the national practices of decolonization and independence movements. This right is a basic principle of international law and collective human right, while also representing a thorny issue. On the basis of the broader provisions on the right to self-determination which the Charter of the United Nations and other existing international law documents have provided, States around the world have adopted different interpretations on the right to self-determination in practice. This was particularly the case for States where population groups advocating separatism        and splittism have attempted to use the aforesaid right to achieve their objectives, making the situation extremely complex and sensitive. Despite the variety of interpretations of the right to self-determination in various social environments and typesofideologies,thereisaconsensusthatpopulationslivingintrustandnon-self-governing territories are entitled to claim the right to self-determination.

 

A.      The Emergence and Issues of the Right toSelf-determination

 

The right to self-determination was gradually accepted in international law after World War II, when the rise of national liberation and independence movements around the world gradually disintegrated the colonial system. As a        result of these movements’ struggles, the right of peoples to self-determination        was included in the Charter of the United Nations alongside with the principle of sovereign equality of States. The Charter of the United Nations Art. 1(2) clearly   states,

To develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, and to take other appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace.

Subsequently, on 14 December 1960, the United Nations General Assembly (hereinafter “General Assembly”) adopted the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, which reaffirmed “the need for     the creation of conditions of stability and well-being and peaceful and friendly  relations based on respect for the principles of equal rights and self-determination of all peoples”.[7]Following, on  14  December 1962, General Assembly issued the Declaration on Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources and, as well, established the United Nations Commission on Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources “to conduct a full survey of the right of peoples and nations to permanent sovereignty over their natural wealth and resources, having noted that   this right formed a basic constituent of the right to self-determination and, where necessary, to make recommendations to strengthen such sovereignty”.[8]In 1966, on the basis of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, General Assembly  also implemented the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, which Art.1 defines the right to self-determination. Afterwards, in 1970, the Declaration on PrinciplesofInternationalLawConcerningFriendlyRelationsandCooperation among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations reaffirmed the right to self-determination once again.

The right to self-determination is the most important collective human right     that the international community has first acknowledged and enshrinedaccordingly. It radically subverted the traditional view that “human rights can only be individual rights” in the field of international human rights.[9]However, although the right  to self-determination has been affirmed in all the above-mentioned international documents, its exact definition and related connotations are not yet unified. This     has resulted in different understandings, among governments and academics, of      the subject as well as connotation and modalities through which this right can be legitimately exerted. For example, who has the right to self-determination? Who     are the “people” entitled to self-determination? How can we distinguish the right of peoplestoself-determinationfromminorityrightsandindigenousrights?Whilethe right to self-determination is a collective human right, can it also be an individual human right? Moreover, how can the right to self-determination be exerted? What is the difference between self-determination and autonomy? How to distinguish the right to self-determination from the right to separation? What is the difference between the right to self-determination and democratic rights? As Professor James Summers,aprominentinternationaljurist,hasnoted:“Self-determinationisnotjust contested, but notoriously ambiguous.”[10]A positivist approach would emphasize    the legal sources of peoples’ rights rather than their underlying values, who may  define self-determination as a general principle, serving as a basic, overarching guidelineandasetofspecificcustomaryrulesdealingwithindividualissues.”[11]

 

B.       Whether the Right to Self-determination Is Controversial Is in Relation to the Territorial Status in Which the PeopleReside

 

Disputes over the right to self-determination can be divided into two main    camps, East and West. Among them, the East Camp represented by the third world have maintained that the subject of the right to self-determination (that is, the concept of “people” or “nations”) only refers to the people who could have but   did not obtain independent sovereignty, which include populations who reside in  either trust and non-self-governing territories or in territories that are “conquered, occupied and exploited by a foreign state”. This stance is mainly based on the history of the right, which, being interspersed with the process of decolonization of the oppressed people or nations, entailed the achievement of sovereign independence represented by the Declaration on the Granting of Independenceto Colonial Countries and Peoples in 1960. Such objective was achieved by both peaceful and non-peaceful means. Peaceful means mainly included legal agreements and referendums while non-peaceful means refers to armed struggles.[12]Scholars from Western developed countries have not denied colonized peoples’ right to self-determination.[13]However, they placed greater emphasis on the universal application of the right to self-determination to all peoples[14]and further linked it to autonomy, democracy and electoral politics. Professor Antonio Cousins is the leading exponent of this stance. He is the first scholar who systematically divided the right to self-determination into internal self-determination and external self-determination[15]while also observing that self-determination does not only represent a powerful means to achieve national independence but also a fundamental tool to establish democracy. According to his twin division, external self-determination pertains to a collective human right which usually related to the liberation from colonial rule, as well as the establishment, independence and separation of a State. Internal self-determination, in contrast, often refers to individual human rights which involves the participation of people of a State in democratic governance andautonomy.[16]

Conversely, most developing countries have opposed the linking of self- determination to democratic rights as it might be used by other States as a pretext    for them to interfere in their own internal affairs as well as exploited by separatist movements and thus jeopardize the territorial integrity of their countries. As Professor BAI Guimei of Peking University has noted that the concept of “internal self-determination”, which is inspired by the “Reservations Clause” of the 1970 Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations,   does not exist in current international law. Consequently, as it has so far been elaborated within international law, the principle of the right of peoples to self- determination has mainly applied to formerly colonized peoples, who have exerted this right primarily through armed struggle to establish new independent States.  If strictly divided, the self-determination in current international law should be    externalself-determination.[17]

In short, the debate over the right to self-determination has not ceased since     the day it entered the arena of international law. As mentioned above, historically,   it was associated with fascists, communists and liberals, as well as claimed by government authorities, national liberation movements and indigenous people.[18]Despite the controversy that these claims have engendered from time to time, to  record, the right to self-determination for people who live in trust and non-self- governing territories and colonies has never been disputed. This basic consensus, known as “colonial self-determination”, “classical determination”, has also been definedas“externalself-determination”.[19]Theself-determinationinatraditional sense is the basis for its acknowledgement as a fundamental principle and basic   human rights in international law. Consequently, international law enshrined this  right as long as the people who claim it reside in trust territories, colonies or non- self-governing territories.

 

II. Origin of Ryukyu Islands’ Status Issue: 1879 “Disposition of Ryukyu” byJapan

 

There has been a clear record in historical accounts that China discovered     Ryukyu and relations between these kingdoms date as far back as the Sui (581 AD- 619 AD) and Tang (618 AD-907 AD) Dynasties of China.[20]The earliest feudal kingdoms on the Ryukyu Islands were established around the 12th century. In the fifth year of the reign of Emperor Hongwu of the Ming Dynasty (1372), three RyukyuanKingdoms,Beishan,ZhongshanandNanshan,begantopaytributetothe imperial court of the Ming Dynasty. On this occasion the Emperor Hongwu issued an official edict to dispatch envoys to the Ryukyu Islands. Since then, Ryukyu Kingdoms formally developed a tributary relationship with China. SHANG Bazhi (ShouHashi),theRyukyuanKingofZhongshan,conqueredBeishanandNanshan respectively in 1416 and 1429. As a result, the aforementioned three kingdoms     merged into what became eventually known as the Ryukyu Kingdom (or  “thefirst Shou Dynasty”). Upon reception of his canonization, the king of the Ryukyu Kingdom paid tributes to the emperor of China for generations. The Ryukyu Kingdom followed the Chinese era name and calendar as well as accepted an all- round impact of Chinese influence upon its politics, culture, social economy and   other aspects. However, the imperial court of China did not interfere in the internal affairs of the Ryukyu Kingdom, allowing its king to run the State as if it was “an independent State”. Being one of the most loyal tributary States of the Ming and   Qing Dynasties, the Ryukyu Kingdom maintained a suzerain-tributary relationship with China for more than 500 years.[21]

In contrast to China, Ryukyu Islands’ relationship with Japan started later with the Meiji Restoration in 1868. In this period, Japan’s economy experienced rapid economic growth which gradually led the State to pursue a militaristic path of aggressive expansion. At that time, the Qing Dynasty was instead facing domestic and foreign strife, which enabled Japan to take some Chinese and neighboring territories as main targets of its territorial expansion. For instance, in 1874, Japan invaded Taiwan during February to December. In 1875, it signed the Treaty of Saint Petersburg with Russia on the exchange of Sakhalin Island and Kuril Archipelago. In October 1876, it announced to the world that Japan had taken over Ogasawara Islands.[22]In 1879, 10 years after the implementation of the Meiji Restoration when its national strength was at the peak, Japan issued the “Disposition of Ryukyu”,     which interrupted the tributary relationship between the Ryukyu Kingdom and   China. Following, Japan sent 450 soldiers and 160 police officers in April 1879      (the 12th year of the Meiji Period) to suppress the “Han (Clan)” of Ryukyu, which had had no military garrison installed for 200 years, as well as to force their king     to move to Tokyo. Consequently, the Ryukyu Kingdom was first abolished and renamed then annexed to the Prefecture of Okinawa, which was ruled by the emperorofJapan.Nonetheless,theso-called“DispositionofRyukyu”,[23]makingthe territorial status of the Ryukyu Islands an “unsolved historical mysteries”, cannot    be legally regarded as either a conquest or a cession, or any other means through which territories could be legitimately acquired according to the international law    of that time.

 

A. IntertemporalRule

 

Any discussion on the legal effect of the “Disposition of Ryukyu” and legal status of the Ryukyu Islands in international law 1879 must take the content and   effect of international law as a frame of reference. International law is the product   of the evolution of international relations, which was not needed until many States were absolutely independent of each other.[24]In light of the distinction in between, international law during the Ming (1368-1644) and Qing (1636-1912) Dynasties of China could not be mentioned in the same breath as contemporary international law and should be better assessed following the principle of “intertemporal rule” than contemporary international law.

In the famous 1928 Island of Palmas Case, the Swiss arbitrator Max Huber, summarized the meaning of  intertemporal rule as  follow: “As regards  the question which of different legal systems prevailing at successive periods is  to be applied in a particular case (the so-called intertemporal law), a distinction  must be made between the creation of rights and the existence of rights. The same principle which subjects the act creative of a right to the law in force at the time the right arises, demands that the existence of the right, in other words its continued manifestation, shall follow the  conditions required by  the  evolution of  law.”[25]The intertemporal law deals with applicable time of a certain rule rather than the validity of time. If the law took effect in any form in the distant past while relevant legal rules have evolved or changed, the question then arises as to whether the    originaloldlawortheexistinglawwillbeapplied.Injurisprudence,theprincipal which approximates the one of intertemporal law the most is the “Principal of Non- Retroactivity of Law”. According to this principal, the rules of modern law cannot be used to explain and regulate past situations and events.

 

B. Ryukyu as a Vassal State of China in the Ming and QingDynasties

 

According to the principle of intertemporal law, only the provisions stipulated in the international law from the 14th to 19th century on State, sovereignty and territories should be applied to determine the legal status of the suzerain-vassal relationship between China and the Ryukyu Kingdom. State and sovereignty    came into being as concepts in international law with the advent of Christian civilization in Europe: The term “sovereignty” was first used in political science by Jean Bodin in his treatise “The Republic” (1576). Influenced by the founder of French absolutism Louis XI’s doctrine of centralized government, Bodin defined sovereignty as the “absolute and permanent power” of the State which is subject to no limitation except for the commandments of God and laws of nature. As an attribute, sovereignty is in the hands of the king when living in a monarchy and it is vested in the people when living in a republic. This definition was widely   accepted by most political scientists in the 16th century. In the 17th century, it was gone beyond by Thomas Hobbes’ elaboration of the concept, in which sovereignty was similarly understood as an unfettered power over everything (even including religion). In the 18th century, the concept was distinguished in “absolute/complete sovereignty”,“relative/incompletesovereignty”and“semi-sovereignty”.According to this distinction, absolute/complete sovereignty belongs to monarchs who enjoy unlimited power at home and abroad while relative/incomplete sovereignty or semi-sovereignty belongs to monarchs who are more or less dependent on other monarchs with regard to the administration of domestic and foreign affairs. In 1787, as American federal government was founded, debates about the divisibility of sovereign power between the federal and states governments began to receive attention by the international community in 19th century. In this regard, it is generally believed that the principle that sovereignty could be divisible was not entirely accepted by the international community of thetime.[26]

There is no doubt that China was an absolute monarchy. As a matter of fact, the emperor had uninterruptedly held absolute sovereignty from the foundation of the Qin Dynasty in the 221 BC until the Xinhai Revolution in 1911, especially in the Ming and Qing Dynasties when China was a unified empire with vast territory. Throughout all those centuries, the emperor represented the supreme legal authority of the State and embodiment of the absolute power of the State. Japanese Scholar Kikoh Nishizatou comprehensively summarized the procedure and political significance of the tributary relationship which existed between China and the   Ryukyu Islands during Ming and Qing Dynasties in his treatise, Studies on the   History of Relations between China, Ryukyu and Japan in the Late Qing Dynasty.  He wrote:

(1) The tributary States, by receiving royal investiture from the emperor of the suzerain (Ming and Qing Dynasties of China) to get their own king officially recognized and by sending frequent missions to tribute local products, established a monarch-subject relationship with the suzerain. Therefore, the relationship between the suzerainty and the vassal State (the suzerain-vassal relationship) allowed the suzerain to politically dominate the vassalState.

(2) The suzerain (Ming and Qing dynasties) does not interfere in the internal affairs (code of ethical conduct) of the vassal state and allows it to enjoy    self-rule as an “autonomous nation” on the condition that the vassal state faithfully fulfilled its obligations (the promises between the monarch and his subjects). However, the suzerain would impose sanctions, including military actions, if the vassal State was considered to have violated the covenant, in    order to assume responsibility for maintaining the political order within the tributesystem.[27]

The emperors of the Ming and Qing Dynasties were typical absolute monarchs. The king of the Ryukyu Kingdom must receive conferment by the Chinese emperor to have the legitimacy. The emperor of China was the only supreme power who moreover held absolute sovereignty over both China and the Ryukyu Kingdom.  To become the king of Ryukyu, as a courtier, must be appointed as such by the emperorofChina.ThevassalkingsofRyukyubenefittedfromthesamestatus and investiture procedure as the local government ministers of China (therefore, the tributary is also called the vassal, which means subservient/vassalage to the emperor of central imperial court). As a tributary State, the Ryukyu Kingdom was legally part of Chinese Empire’s territory and sovereignty over the former kingdom belonged to the emperors of the latter. In some regards, Chinese emperor’s letter of conferment to the king of Ryukyu, acting as a letter of appointment in the legal sense, retained the title of Ryukyuan King as the local authority. At that time, the sovereign form of the China-Ryukyu relationship is similar to the contemporary “one country, two systems”, where the central government of the China nominated the King of Ryukyu as the supreme local authority and invested him withconsiderable political autonomy within his ownjurisdiction.[28]

During the tributary period, the use of Chinese era name, characters and calendar in the Ryukyu Kingdom further demonstrates Ryukyu’s recognition of the absolute sovereignty of the Chinese Emperor. In this regard, as Japanese scholar Toshirou Obata has noted:

In the past, China has long maintained a unique China-centered international order, namely the “Hua-Yi Order (the China-vassal States’ International Order)”. Within the international state system centered on China, the neighboring tributary States all belong to China. The former tributary and title-conferment relationship between them is the most concrete manifestation  of this suzerain-vassal relationship.29[29]

From this perspective, he emphasizes:

For China, the Ryukyu Islands deviate from the Diaoyu Islands, which are never deemed as are not foreign countries, but are seen as within the scope of its suzerainty, so that the islands are understood as under China’s sphere of influence.[30]

By “sphere of influence”, Obata means sovereignty in that, back then, the supreme sovereignty of the emperor under absolute monarchy was absolute thus indivisible. The voluntary allegiance and attachment of the Ryukyuan king to the Chinese emperor was an affirmation of the sovereign State as the “unique supreme authority”. In terms of the intertemporal law and international law at that time,       unlike European political science, there was no theory or concept of sovereignty  in China, but China’s formal and complete title-conferment system shows that  within the territory of Empire of China in the Ming and Qing dynasties, there was   no supreme leader with the same authority in law as the Chinese emperor. This is consistent with the definition of sovereignty as elaborated by Bodin and Hobbes. Accordingly, the Ryukyu Kingdom must be considered as not an “independentsovereign state” but a self-governing territory (known as “tributary territory” then   in the ancient parlance). As a matter of fact, during the Ming and Qing dynasties, both Ryukyu and Fujian Province were held as under the jurisdiction of the central imperial court of China, enjoying equal status at the administrative level. According to these dynasties’ records, there was even a geographical boundary, the “Heishuigou” (“Okinawa Trough”) to distinguish the Ryukyu Islands and Fujian Provincewhichborderingeachother.In1640,inoneofitsofficialcommunications addressing the Fujian Province, the king of Ryukyustated:

Forgeneration,theRyukyuKingdomhasbeenlocatedintheeastcornerofthe Empire, vitally interrelated with the central imperial court, it is only separated from the adjacent Fujian Province by a nature ready-made geographical boundary.

Due to its width, color, flow direction and other geographical and geological characteristics, “Heishuigou” has become the nature ready-made boundary between the Ryukyu Kingdom and Fujian Province. As ZHOU Huang stated in Annals of the Kingdoms of Ryukyu in 1756:

The Ryukyu Islands are surrounded by the sea. In the west, there is Heishuigou as the sea boundary between Ryukyu and Fujian. Sailing from Fujian to Ryukyu, you must pass through the Cangshui and Heishui.

The term “闽海界Min Haijie (Sea Boarder of Fujian Province)”, which is mentioned above, further demonstrates that “Heishuigou” was  regarded as  notonly a natural division by geography but also the official administrative boundary separating the Ryukyu Kingdom from the Fujian Province.[31]

 

C. Japan Shall Not Obtain the Territorial Sovereignty of the Ryukyu Islands by “Disposition ofRyukyu”

 

The “Disposition of Ryukyu” troubled the tributary relationship which had  existed between China and Ryukyu for centuries.[32]Following the principle of intertemporal law,  as the 1879 “Disposition of Ryukyu” was implemented in the   19th century, traditional international law must be applied to assess its validity.[33]Traditional international law encompasses five modalities through which acquiring territorial sovereignty: occupation, cession, accretion, conquest, and prescription. The“DispositionofRyukyu”obviouslydoesnotabidebyanymodesofoccupation accretion or  prescription.[34]Strictly  speaking,  it conforms to  none of cessionand conquest.

 

1.     “Disposition of Ryukyu” Was Not Obtained Through War, Thus DidNot Conform to the Mode ofConquest

 

Prior the signing of the 1928 Pact of Paris (known as the “General Treaty for  the Renunciation of War”  or “Kellogg-Brien Pact”), war was permitted by law as  oneofthenaturalfunctionsofaStateand,accordingly,conquestwasacknowledged as legitimate mode of acquiring territory.[35]However, to be considered legal, the      act of conquest had to abide by a few conditions. As the Permanent Court of International Justice stated on the occasion of the Eastern Greenland Case between Denmark and Norway in1933:

“Conquest” only operates as a cause of loss of sovereignty when there is war between two States and by reason of the defeat of one of them sovereignty over territory passes from the loser to the victorious State.36[36]

At the time when conquest was a valid title of acquisition of territorial sovereignty, it was subordinated to the fulfilment of three particular conditions. The material element was the effective control over the seized territory after the close of hostilities. In addition, a previous declaration of war establishing the existence of a state of war among the belligerents was a formal premise. A treaty of peace putting an end to that state of war and endorsing the transfer of sovereignty was perceive as a third decisive condition”.[37]Among these three conditions, disagreement exists about the necessity of the last one.[38]However, apart from the latter two conditions, the “Disposition of Ryukyu” plainly fell short to satisfy the very first conditions, which is preliminary “declaration of war” or “state of war”.

Firstly, Japan’s acquisition of the territorial sovereignty over Ryukyu presupposed a state of war between China and Japan. However, Japan did not declare war on China when carrying out the “Disposition of Ryukyu” in 1879. Nor did China and Japan engage in a war to settle the issue. By definition,  to qualify as a war, any given conflict must be armed  conflict  between  two or more States, aiming at subjugating a rival, and the victorious party is expected to arbitrarily set the conditions of peace on the defeated one.[39]In international law, unilateral acts of force by a State against another without prior declaration of war  may be the cause of the outbreak of war, but such acts of force are not recognized  as war as long as the other party does not respond with similar hostile acts, or at   least does not declare that it considers them to be acts of war.

Moreover, even if a State conducts illegal acts of force against another, such  as occupying part of the territory of the other, they do not constitute acts of war  as long as the other State does not resort to confront them by force or, at least,    does not declare that it considers such acts to be acts of war.[40]As a case in point, although Japan, in the “Disposition of Ryukyu”, sent hundreds of soldiers and        police officer to remove the king of Ryukyu as well as abolished the Ryukyu Kingdom and annexed it as a prefecture of Japan by issuing a royal decree, neither of these actions qualified as a declaration of war nor they were acknowledged as an act of war and resisted with similar hostile acts by the Ryukyu Kingdom. Fromthis perspective, the “Disposition of Ryukyu” cannot be regarded as a war.

Secondly, the “Disposition of Ryukyu” is secretly imposed by Japan. Having been a vassal State, the Ryukyu Kingdom did not have its own armed forces and could not be granted with the belligerent status. More to the point,    in the eyes of classical international law, belligerency is a formal status involving rights and duties.[41]Only a State with full sovereignty can become a belligerent; semi-sovereign States or partially sovereign States do not legally qualify as belligerents.[42]According to the traditional international law,  as a vassal State of  China, the Ryukyu Kingdom can be considered as the same as a client State to the suzerain. As such, the Ryukyu Kingdom had no right to maintain any diplomatic relation with other States because it was taken by the suzerain China; and, accordingly, the Ryukyu Kingdom could act independently from China only within the sphere of internal affairs as a semi-sovereign State. In other words, even when   it is considered as a client State, the Ryukyu Kingdom was but a part of China and, as such, albeit it could enjoy international recognition, any treaty concerning it had to be signed by as well as applied to the suzerain State if there were no exceptions. Wars involving the suzerain undoubtedly involve the client States aswell.[43]

As Kikoh Nishizatou has stated in his book:

In the process of sending troops to Taiwan, the Meiji government took measures on Ryukyu in October 1872 (the fifth year of the Meiji period). Shou Tai, the last king of Ryukyu was enforced to become a Marquis of Japan, with the kingdom transformed into “Okinawa Han”. This measure is definitely a thoughtful deployment to treat the “sovereignty” issue of the Ryukyu Islands    as Japan’s “internal affairs”. However, the kingship of the Ryukyu Kingdom was ultimately conferred by the suzerain, Qing Dynasty of China. Therefore,  aslongastherelationshipbetweentheQingDynastyandtheRyukyuKingdom lasts, the Meiji government shall not arbitrarily treat Shou Tai, who had been conferredasthekingofvassal,asacountymagistrateofJapan.The“abolition of vassal” in a legal sense shall be between China and Japan instead of Ryukyu and Japan.[44]

After that, although the First Sino-Japanese War broke out in 1894, it mainly concerned territorial issues in Korea and Taiwan, not involving the territorial   issue of Ryukyu. All these things considered, Japan’s “disposition” of the Ryukyu Kingdom did not conform to “conquest” as a method of acquiring territory

2.      “Disposition of Ryukyu” Did Not Result in Any Conclusion of Treaty Between China and Japan, Thus Did Not Conform to the Mode ofCession.

Cession is an understanding under international law by which territory is transferred from one State to another with the consent of both States. It is one of      the modes by which States can lawfully acquire territory, and since it is based on mutual consent, it is presumably today the mode having the greatest practical relevance.[45]As cession requires the consent of both States involved, it normally     takes place by means of a treaty or any other form of understanding.[46]In 1879, the Qing government of China lodged a protest against Japan. This protest paved the    way for a treaty negotiation between China and Japan which was, however, never completed. As no agreement was reached between the two parties, China never      ceded its sovereignty over the RyukyuIslands.

At the request of the Qing government, former U.S. president Ulysses S. Grant also mediated Sino-Japanese talks over the Ryukyu Islands during his travel in East Asia in 1879. When meeting with Grant in June 1879, LI Hongzhang stated that:

It does not matter if the Ryukyu Kingdom pays tributes to China. What matters is that the king of Ryukyu has always been conferred by China. Japan had no right to remove the king of Ryukyu, which is a violation of international law.   This had never happened to any other country.

Likewise, Grant claimed that:

The Ryukyu Kingdom was a State that enjoyed self-rule. Japan aimed at expanding its territory by annexing the Ryukyu Islands. It is quite reasonable for China to strive for territory, not just for tribute. To make it clear, another special article is needed in the future.[47]

A protracted negotiation between China and Japan over the status of the Ryukyu Kingdom followed LI Shuchang, who was Qing Dynasty’s second envoy to Japan, with the renegotiation of the Ryukyu dispute as his mission, resided in Japan for nearly ten years, from when he first took office in late 1881 (the seventh year of the reign of Emperor Guangxu) to the end of 1890 (the sixteenth year of the reign of Emperor Guangxu) when he returned from second term in office.

At the suggestion of President Grant and John A. Bingham, who was then the U.S.’ envoy to Japan,[48]the Qing government first proposed to separate the Ryukyu Islands as follows:

ThecentralislandsbelongtotheRyukyuKingdomwhichshallberestoredwith its monarch re-established. China and Japan can avail themselves of consular protection respectively: the southern islands, which are close to Taiwan and of strategic importance to China, belong to China; the northern islands, which    are close to Satsuma and of strategic importance to Japan, belong toJapan.[49]

However, Japan rejected China’s proposal and, instead, advanced the following division: the northern and central islands (Okinawa Island) to Japan, and the southern islands (Miyako, Yaeyama) to China.[50]

As these Sino-Japan negotiations were taking place, the Qing dynasty had to face a border dispute with the Russian Empire over Ili. For  fear that Japan and Russia might have joint forces, the Qing government decided to agree to  Japan’s proposal on the division of the Ryukyu Islands into only two sections but  also obtained for the Sino-Japanese Trade Treaty to be amended so that it could include provisions allowing the Japanese to trade with mainland China.[51]Known    as the “Case of Islands Division and Treaty Amendment”,[52]this treaty concerted provisions on trade in addition to the equal division of the Ryukyu Islands to make enjoy “Most Favored Nation treatment”.[53]The negotiations in the case lasted from 18 August 1880 to 21 October 1880. However, in spite of the fact that a basic consensus had been reached after eight formal negotiations during the 64 days, the treaty was never formally signed. In other words, since the agreement was not ratified, not formal “cession” has everoccurred.

Hence, the status of the Ryukyu Islands has been “pending” for several decades. Since then, China has never recognized Japan’s “rule” on the Ryukyu Islands. From the late Qing Dynasty to the defeat of Japan in World War II, CHIANG Kai-shek, FENG Yuxiang, SOONG Tse-ven and others had successively stated their intention of “Taking Back the Ryukyu Islands”.[54]

It can be seen that from the “Disposition of Ryukyu” in 1879 to the end of      World War II, Japan’s rule over Ryukyu was never recognized by China, the Ryukyuan people or the entire international community.[55]The essential reason is     that Japan’s “Disposition of Ryukyu” represented a unilateral act not in accordance with the conditions set by traditional international law at that time and did not    conform to any modes of acquiring territory.[56]

 

III.   Ryukyu Becoming a Potential Candidate for Trusteeship

 

The Ryukyu Islands attained a chance to redispose its territorial status at the     end of World War II. After occupying Japan in 1945, the Allied Powers split the Ryukyu Islands from Japan, terminating its destiny as one of Japan’s colonies.  However, when the Korean War broke out in 1950, the Ryukyu Islands were again used as a bargaining chip in political deals. As shown in the 1951 San Francisco Peace Treaty, albeit ambiguously, the Ryukyu Islands and Daito Islands were placed under the U.S. trusteeship system, making the U.S. their sole administering authority. Following the outbreak of the Vietnam War in 1955, the Ryukyu Islands became a key location of the U.S. Pacific defense perimeter, and were again reduced to a bargaining chip when the Agreement Between the United States of America and Japan Concerning the Ryukyu Islands and the Daito Islands was signed in 1972. In accordance with the Agreement, the U.S. privately transferred the administration over the Ryukyu Islands to Japan on the condition that a mass of US major military bases would have been retained in Ryukyu. From then on, Japan has been exercising administration of the Islands.

 

A.          Occupied Differentially by theU.S.

 

In the aftermath of World War II, Germany was split into four occupation     zones, which were administered by France, the UK, the U.S., and the Soviet Union respectively. Such joint administration caused chaos in the postwar Germany.   As the Cold War began in 1947, the relationship between powers in the Eastern Bloc (the Soviet Union and its satellite States) and the Western Bloc (the U.S., its NATO allies and others) deteriorated. To prevent the chaotic state of Germany from recurring in Japan, the resolution concerning the Soviet Union’s joint occupation    of Japan was cancelled. With the exception of the western region of Honshu, which was occupied by the UK, [57]most of Japan was exclusively placed under control of   the U.S. Neither China nor the Soviet Union wasinvolved.[58]

WhenU.S.troopscontrolledJapan,RyukyuIslandsweretreatedasa“territory detached from an enemy State”, for Japan and the U.S. were still in a state of          enmity during the period between the end of World War II and the signing of the Treaty of Peace with Japan in 1951. On the basis of the post-surrender policy which was formulated for Japan prior to World War II, Japan was placed under indirect control of the Supreme Command for the Allied Powers (SCAP). That is to say, the Mikado system was reserved, and Japan was indirectly ruled by the SCAP through the Japanese government.[59]Unlike other areas of Japan, the Ryukyu Islands were ruled as a “detached disposition” as well as treated by the SCAP as an “areaoutside ofJapan”[60].

In international law, the U.S. military authority over Ryukyu is referred to as “occupation during the war”. Occupation is different from invasion in that the former refers to the provisional control by a certain ruling power over a territory while the latter aiming at the acquisition of a territory.[61]If either of the States at war successfully occupies the whole or part of the other’s territory, it will have  achieved an important dual goal of war, that is, using the territorial resources of the vanquished State for military purpose and safeguarding military victory with provisional ownership over it, thus forcing the vanquished State to accept the conditions of peace imposed on it.[62]

 

B.           Defined as a “Potential Candidates for Trusteeship” in Treaty of Peace with Japan

 

Though Ryukyu was occupied by the U.S., its actual territorial statuswasstillpending.U.S.’militarycontroldidnotaimatterritorialacquisition.Inthisregard,signingapeacetreatyrepresentedthemostlogicalstrategytoterminatethewar.On4September1951,52nationsgatheredforthelasttimeinSanFranciscotonegotiate and conclude a treaty of peace with Japan. The treaty adoptedon this conferencewas Treaty of Peace with Japan. However, also known as the SanFranciscoPeaceTreaty, this treaty wasone-sided as it prioritized the strategic interests of theU.S.China,whohadundertakenan8-year-longwarofresistanceagainstJapan,wasnot invited.Amongtheinvitednations:theSovietUnion,PolandandCzechoslovakia refusedtosignthetreaty.India,BurmaandYugoslavialikewiserefusedtoparticipate.4ofthe52attendingStatesdidnotsignthetreaty,andtwoofthefourleadingAlliedPowers–ChinaandtheSovietwerenotthesignatoriestothistreaty.[63]

TheonsetoftheKoreanWarrepresentstheU.S.’realincentivetoexcludeChinaandtheSovietUnionfromthepeacenegotiationswithJapan.TheKorean War,whichbeganon25June1950,puttheRyukyuIslandsbackonthemapof thegeopoliticalandmilitaryinterestsoftheU.S.,makingstrategicsignificanceof JapantotheU.S.greatlyboosted.TheformerRepublicanforeign-affairsspokesman JohnFosterDulleswasappointedasasenioradvisorattheSanFranciscoconference. Heformulatedthefinaldraftofthepeacetreaty.Article3oftheDulles-draftededitionis concerned with Ryukyu. In previous drafts of the same treaty, articlespertainingto Ryukyu clearly stated that “Japan should abandon its sovereignty overtheRyukyus”.[64]

IntheDullesdraftofthetreaty,whichwasgrantedbyJapan,theaforementioned statement, however, was removed in favor of the vaguely wordedArticle 3,whichplacedtheRyukyuIslandsunderthetrusteeshipsystem[65]oftheUnitedNationswiththeU.S.asthesoleadministeringauthorityupontheapprovaloftheUnitedNations GeneralAssemblyorSecurityCouncil.[66]ThisarticlealsomadeprovisionfortheU.S. to administer the Ryukyu Islands till the trusteeship system was fully set in place.[67]

In the Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law, the entry of    “United Nations Trusteeship System” states that according to the Article 3  of     the Treaty of Peace with Japan, since trusteeship was never implemented,[68]the Ryukyu Islands can be regarded as a “potential candidate for trusteeship among territories ‘detached from enemy states’”.[69]Furthermore, as the treaty drafter John Foster Dulles pointed out in the speech concerning “residual sovereignty” that he delivered at the signing of the Treaty of Peace with Japan, Ryukyu Islands were “territories which may be detached from enemy states as a result of the Second      World War” (as said in Article 77 of the Charter of United Nations). Moreover, as  he added: “the future trusteeship agreement will, no doubt, determine the future civil status of the inhabitants in relation to Japan ... ”[70]Known as the “Residual Sovereignty Notion”,71 [71]Dulles’s statement further emphasizes how Japan did not  retain any sovereignty or sovereignty basis over the Ryukyu Islands. As Article 77 of the Charter of the United Nations setsforth:

The trusteeship system shall apply to such territories in the following categories as may be placed thereunder by means of trusteeship agreements:

a. territories now held undermandate;

b.   territories which may be detached from enemy states as a result of the Second World War;and

c. territoriesvoluntarilyplacedunderthesystembystatesresponsiblefortheir administration.

As this passage illustrates, the Ryukyu Islands belong to the category of “territories which may be detached from enemy states as a result of the Second World War”.[72]In this regard, its sovereign status should be determined through the UN trusteeship system, which includes signing the trusteeship agreement.

 

C.          Territorial Status Pending under 1971 Agreement Concerning the Ryukyu Islands and the DaitoIslands

 

The Treaty of Peace with Japan conferred the U.S. with the right to administer the Ryukyu Islands with the objective of placing the Ryukyu under the trusteeship   of the United Nations. However, during its 20-odd-year administration of Ryukyu, the U.S., as the administering authority, never carried out any act to place Ryukyu under the UN’s trusteeship system.[73]With the outbreak of the Vietnam War, the Ryukyu Islands became a strategically important area again. Consequently, the U.S. and Japan privately signed the Agreement Between the United States of America and Japan Concerning the Ryukyu Islands and the Daito Islands in 1971.[74]The signing of this bilateral agreement permitted for the resolution of the issue concerning the territorial status of the Ryukyu Islands to be set aside once more as  a result of a second political deal between the U.S. andJapan.

The Agreement Between the United States of America and Japan Concerning the Ryukyu Islands and the Daito Islands was signed on 17 June 1971,75[75]which       was called in abbreviation by the media and the academia of the U.S. Abbreviated   as the “Okinawa Reversion Agreement”, the aforementioned Agreement could  have been easily misunderstood as an arrangement permitting the “returning of the sovereignty over Okinawa to Japan”. Despite being mentioned in the speeches, press conferences and media reports delivered on the occasion of the signing, the   textitselfoftheAgreementdoesneitherincludethewords“ReversionofOkinawa” nor mention arrangements of sovereignty-reversion-related affairs. As a matter of fact, the text of the agreement does not even employ the term “Okinawa”, as the territory in question is consistently referred to as “Ryukyu”.[76]The so-called “OkinawaReversion”issuewasembodiedinArticle1oftheAgreement:

With respect to the Ryukyu Islands and the Daito Islands, as defined in paragraph 2 below, the United States of America relinquishes in favour of      Japan all rights and interests under Article III of the Treaty of Peace with       Japan signed at the City of San Francisco on September 8, 1951, effective        as of the date of entry into force of this Agreement. Japan, as of such date, assumes full responsibility and authority for the exercise of all and any    powers of administration, legislation and jurisdiction over the territory and inhabitants of the saidislands.

As this passage demonstrates, Article 1 does not make any reference to changing of the sovereign status. Rather, it is only concerned with the relinquishing of powers   of administration, legislation and jurisdiction and the disposal of these obligations underArticle3oftheTreatyofPeacewithJapan,whichwillbediscussedlaterin this article.

The U.S. Department of State stated in its bulletin that the “Reversion of Okinawa” to Japan represented a guarantee for the enduring existence of the U.S.    in such territory, which further acknowledged Japan’s residual sovereignty over Okinawa according to the definition that Dulles provided of the notion of residual sovereignty at the San Francisco Peace Conference in September 1951.[77]The U.S. announced its standpoint beyond the frame of the treaty, thus misled the public by using the entangling “Reversion of Okinawa” with “Residual Sovereignty”. By     means of political tricks and text camouflage, the U.S. successfully deceived the     rest of the world powers and cast the Ryukyu Islands at the margins of history one more time.

Based on earlier studies, the statement of “Residual Sovereignty” can be considered a paradoxical political concept which, furthermore, cannot generate rights or obligations. The idea of residual sovereignty expressed by Dulles at the signing of the Treaty  of Peace with Japan in 1951, and the one declared by Japan   and the U.S. at the signing of the Agreement Between the United States of America and Japan Concerning the Ryukyu Islands and the Daito Islands, though using the same terms, differ strikingly in meanings. In his speech, Dulles expressed respect    for Article 3 of the Treaty of Peace with Japan as well as the provisions regarding trusteeshipintheCharteroftheUnitedNations.Inthisregard,hisspeechexpressed expectation for a future agreement to determine Ryukyu’s territorial status. This     was not the case when the U.S. and Japan signed the Agreement Between the United States of America and Japan Concerning the Ryukyu Islands and the Daito Islands in 1971. On the occasion of this agreement, the concept of “residual sovereignty” was conflated with the assumption that “Japan retains sovereignty” over the Ryukyu Islands, which was to be reverted to or “Reversion of Okinawa”.   In fact, if “Japan retained sovereignty” over the Ryukyu Islands, the Ryukyu Islands would not have ever been placed under the trusteeship of the United Nations since these two political statuses are irreconcilable with each other according to what is specified in the Charter of the UnitedNations.[78]

Hence, the Agreement Between the United States of America and Japan Concerning the Ryukyu Islands and the Daito Islands contradicts the provisions      that the Treaty of Peace with Japan made with regard to placing the Ryukyu Islands under the trusteeship of the UN as well as infringed the Ryukyuan people’s right to self-determination. Since self-determination is regarded as a jus cogens rule,[79]and any treaty should be void if it conflicts with the jus cogens norms,[80]the Agreement Between the United States of America and Japan Concerning the Ryukyu Islands   and the Daito Islands should be regarded as illegal and should not be considered as a legal mandate for Japan’s rule over the RyukyuIslands.

 

IV. Ryukyuan People Enjoying Indisputable Right to Self- Determination

 

According to what discussed above, the Ryukyu Islands have been a Japanese colony since the 1879 disposition. In the aftermath of World War II, the Ryukyu Islands were detached from Japan and occupied by the U.S. In 1951, the Ryukyu Islands were disposed as a “potential candidates for trusteeship among territories” with the U.S. as the sole administering authority under Article 3 of the Treaty of Peace with Japan. The status of the Ryukyu Islands was still pending. In 1971, the Agreement Between Japan and the United States of America Concerning the Ryukyu Islands and the Daito Islands was signed under the table. Despite having   been referred to as the as “Okinawa Reversion Agreement”, this agreement in fact did not involve any disposition of the Ryukyu Islands’ sovereignty. Rather, it just handed over the U.S.’ administrative right to Japan under Article 3 of the Treaty of Peace with Japan. Hence, Japan’s sovereignty over the Ryukyu Islands lacks any legal foundation. Consequently, as to-be-trusted territory, people living in Ryukyu Islands have the right to claim self-determination. As argued in the first part ofthis article, while internal self-determination might be controversial in international law, external self-determination for peoples who live in “trust territories, colonies and non-self-governing territories”, is widely accepted aslegitimate.

 

A. Entitled to Call for Independence

 

Provisions for people who live in trust territories, colonies and non-self- governing territories to claim the right to self-determination are present in voluminous international law documents apart from the Charter of the United Nations and the 1960 Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. Both the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights provide:

The States Parties to the present Covenant, including those having responsibility for the administration of Non-Self-Governing and Trust Territories,shallpromotetherealizationoftherightofself-determination,and shall respect that right, in conformity with the provisions of the Charter of the UnitedNations.

The 1970 Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States in accordance with the Charter of the    United Nations also claims:

To bring a speedy end to colonialism, having due regard to the freely expressed will of the peoples concerned; and bearing in mind that subjection of peoples   to alien subjugation, domination and exploitation constitutes a violation of the principle, as well as a denial of fundamental human rights, and is contrary to the Charter … The territory of a colony or other Non-Self-Governing Territory has, under the Charter, a status separate and distinct from the territory of the State administering it …

Hence,theRyukyuanpeoplehavetherighttoclaimindependenceand,accordingly, demand for the Ryukyu Islands to be separated from the “territory” of Japan, its present administering State, thus enjoy a distinct sovereignstatus. In fact, the Ryukyuan people have aspired to independence since the onset of World War II. In name, the Ryukyu Islands are part of Japan’s territory; in reality,  the Ryukyuan people have never been treated as part of the Japanese, especially  during World War II.[81]During this battle, which was regarded by many as “the bloodiest battle of the Pacific Theater”,[82]besides being attacked by the U.S.’troops, the Ryukyuan people were also persecuted by the Japanese troops who looted food, sex enslaved local women and forced residents of all ages to kill themselves and    each other (includinginfants).[83]

During the post-war occupation period, the Ryukyu Islands were overall militarized, and the currency was made a type of military scrip called B yen.[84]The administration of the islands constantly changed hands, from the U.S. army to the navy, until the United States Civil Administration of the Ryukyu Islands (USCA)  was finally established in 1950.[85]Whenever local residents left or returned the    islands, they had to possess a Sailing Certification (like a passport or visa) which    was issued by the USCA. In 1950, the USCA released a national flag of Ryukyu    and, despite it was not widely used.[86]During the administrative period of the USCA, Ryukyuan civil ships could use it instead of the Japanese and American one.[87]Around the time when the Treaty of Peace with Japan was signed, the Ryukyuan people began to campaign for self-determination. As testified by theletter below which the author read (see Fig. 1) in Britain’s National Archives, which was sent from the Association of Indigenous People in the Ryukyus to the
 
 

 British Embassy, the Ryukyuan people denounced Japan’s invasion since 1609 and the illegal disposition of Ryukyu in 1897 besides expressing fierce resistance to Japanese rule.[88]

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Fig.1 Pictures of the letter from the Association of Indigenous People in the Ryukyus.

 

As Ryukyuan writer Yamagata Eiji said:


 

At the end of World War II, some Japanese politicians, ignorant as they can be of history, shouted that the Ryukyu Islands should return to Japan. It is ridiculous. As far as I am concerned, I do not think of Japan as my motherland. My motherland is Ryukyu. She is our one and onlymotherland!

Similarly, Ryukyuan scholar Furatto Taimu also noted: “Ryukyu is definitely not part of Japan. The issue of Ryukyu is not about retrocession. Rather, it is about reestablishment.”[lxxxix]Before the signing of 1971 Agreement Concerning the Ryukyu Islands and the Daito Islands, the Ryukyuan people launched pro-independence movements in 1968. Led by Ryukyu Independence Party, the Ryukyu Independence Movement is still active. The Ryukyu Independence Party has drafted the ConstitutionoftheRepublicoftheRyukyus,publishedaseriesoftheoreticalworks on Ryukyu independence as well as penned a manifesto and designed aflag.[xc]

 

B. Entitled to Call for a Referendum under the UNSupervision

 

As a trust-territory-to-be, people from the Ryukyu Islands, who can use the disposal of a trust territory as a reference, are entitled to claim the right to self- determination by means of either signing a trusteeship agreement, holding a referendum or by other means as long as this is approved by the United Nations General Assembly or Security Council. Actually, all the territories placed under the trusteeship system of the United Nations have their sovereign status determined.  From 1945, which is when the UN Trusteeship Council held its first conference, to 1994, there had been a total 11 territories placed under administration of the UN Trusteeship Council.[xci]Eight of the 11 territories, approved by the UN General Assembly in 1946, were placed under the trusteeship of the UN Trusteeship Council. Most of these UN trusts have become independent States or been incorporated into a neighboring State by holding a referendum.

In 1956, British Togoland, the first territory under the UN trusteeship, obtained self-determination through referendum and was incorporated into Ghana together with the non-self-governing territory of Gold Coast, which was then a protectorate administered by the UK.[xcii]In April 1960, French Togoland gained likewise independence in 1956 and became an autonomous republic, after holding   a referendum and signing an agreement with the local legislature under the supervision of the United Nations.[xciii]In 1960, Cameroon, which had been formerly administrated by France, gained independence and became the Republic of Cameroon.[xciv]In 1960, Italian Somaliland, which was the only trust territory agreed to a 10-year term of trusteeship, united with Somalia and British Somaliland.[xcv]In 1961, by means of referendum, British Cameroon was divided into a northern part, which was incorporated into Nigeria, and a southern part, which became part of Cameroon.[xcvi]In 1961, British Tanganyika became independent and in 1964 united with the former British protectorate of Zanzibar which had achieved independence in 1963 as the United Republic of Tanzania.[xcvii]The United Nations General Assembly adopted Resolution 1626 (XVI) on 18 October 1961 which terminated the trusteeship agreement of Western Samoa. In this way, Western Samoa gained independence in the 1 January 1962 referendum under the supervision of the United Nations, becoming the first trust territory in the Pacific region to get independent. It was renamed as Samoa in 1997.[xcviii]As its  formeradministering authority, New Zealand signed a friendship treaty with Samoa in 1962 and, since, acted as its sponsor.[xcix]In 1962, the United Nations General Assembly adopted Resolution 1746 (XVI) and discontinued the trusteeship agreement with Belgium and split the twin trust territory Ruanda-Urundi into the two independent States of Rwanda and Urundi (now known as Burundi). On 19 December 1967, the United Nations General Assembly adopted Resolution 2347 (XXII) which ended the trusteeship agreement of Nauru, allowing for this small Pacific island to become     an independent State on 30 January 1968.[c]Similarly, the Australia-administered New Guinea and the non-self-governing Papua formed an administration compact and became the Independent State of Papua New Guinea on 16 September 1975.  The United Nations General Assembly adopted the Resolution 3284 (XXIX) which terminated the trusteeship agreement of Papua New Guinea on 13 December 1974.[ci]

Under Articles 82 and 83 of the Charter of the United Nations, the formerJapanese mandates in the Pacific Islands were disposed as the only strategic trust with the U.S. as the sole administering authority, which was decided and  adopted by the United Nations Security Council in 1947. On 22 December 1990, the United Nations Security Council approved Resolution 683 which ended the trusteeship agreement of Micronesia, Marshall Islands and Northern Mariana Islands of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands (TTPI).[cii]These three territories have all achieved full autonomy and independence by exercising the right to self- determination. The Federated States of Micronesia were founded; the Republic of the Marshall Islands came into being as a sovereign State in 1979 as well as entered into a Compact of Free Association with the U.S. in 1986. Mariana Islands likewise became a self-governing commonwealth in association with the U.S. Palau, the last member of the TTPI, ended its status as a trust territory based on Resolution 956 which adopted by the United Nations Security Council on 10 November 1994 and,consequently,becameasovereignState.PalaualsosignedaCompactofFree Association with the U.S. in 1992.[ciii]

 

C. Entitled to Call for Returning to the Framework of Postwar Peace Treaty Settlement

 

On 21 November 1979, KING Shoo-chi, as representative of Taiwan,  lodged   a protest against the U.S. government with regard to the legal status of Ryukyu. As heputit,thestatusoftheRyukyuIslandsshouldbedeterminedthroughnegotiation between the chief of the Allied powers of World War II in conformity with the1943 Cairo Declaration and the 1945 Potsdam Declaration.[civ]Such a view represents   another path through which to determine and legitimate the territorial status of the RyukyuIslands.

As mentioned above, the 1971 Agreement Between the United States of America and Japan concerning the Ryukyu Islands and the Daito Islands did not   touch upon the disposition of the sovereignty of Ryukyu Islands. Rather, it just       states that:

The United States of America relinquishes in favour of Japan all rights and interests under Article III of the Treaty of Peace with Japan signed at the City of San Francisco on September 8, 1951, effective as of the date of entry into force of this Agreement. Japan, as of such date, assumes full responsibilityand authority for the exercise of all and any powers of administration, legislation and jurisdiction over the territory and inhabitants of the saidislands.

As the passage above illustrates, the Agreement aimed at modifying the disposition of the rights and obligations of the Article 3 of Treaty of Peace with Japan. However, the 1951 Treaty of Peace with Japan, being a multilateral peace treaty signed by 48 States, this could just be modified by solely agreement between the U.S. and Japan under the table?

Under the international law principle of sovereign equality and independence   of all States, a proposed amendment to a treaty in force shall be adopted under    consent of all State Parties to the treaty. As it is stated in the 1871 London Declaration, one of the major international law principles is that, only when it is agreed by all State parties on the basis of friendly consultation, can one State discharge any other of the obligations stipulated under the treaty or modify the clauses thereof.[cv]With the evolution of international law,  such a provision has  been modified. In pursuance of Articles 39 and 40 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, an amendment of a multilateral treaty does not need to be agreed by all parties any longer. However, any proposal of amendment must be notified to all the contracting States, which, in turn, have had the right to take part in the negotiation and decision making related to the proposed amendment, unless it is stated otherwise. There is no special provision on treaty amendment  in the Treaty of Peace with Japan, but Article 23 of Chapter 7 thereof definitely provides that the treaty “will come into force for all the States which have then ratified it,  when instruments of  ratification have been deposited by  Japan and  by a majority, including the United States of America”. In light of the relevant  provisions on treaty amendment under the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, any amendment to the Treaty of Peace with Japan should follow the right procedure and therefore notify the proposal to all State Parties that they shall take part in negotiation and consultation, and that conclusion and entry into force of the amended treaty shall be agreed and ratified by a majority of States. Of course, the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties does not exclude the possibility     that a multilateral treaty might be modified between certain parties only, but such provision is rigidly limited as clarified by Article41:

Two or more of the parties to a multilateral treaty may conclude an agreement to modify the treaty as between themselves alone if:

(a)         thepossibilityofsuchamodificationisprovidedforbythetreaty;or

(b)         themodificationinquestionisnotprohibitedbythetreatyand:

(i) doesnotaffecttheenjoymentbytheotherpartiesoftheirrightsunderthe

treaty or the performance of their obligations;

(ii) does not relate to a provision, derogation from which is incompatible with

the effective execution of the object and purpose of the treaty as a whole.

However, in light of the object and purpose of the Treaty of Peace with Japan, provisions of Article 3 thereof shall be collectively decided by all the parties concerned, not just by the U.S. and Japan under the table.

Firstly, the purpose of signing a peace treaty is to dispose the issues concerned with war and territory, multilateral peace treaties have historically been a common international practice to settle territorial disputes. Hence, peace treaties impose   stricter requirements for the Great Powers to take concerted action. In view of the European history, the claim of the superpower usually played a pivotal role in the conclusion of a peace treaty and the territorial disposition in Europe. But territorial dispositions under multilateral treaties reveal a practice of Great Powers agreement on the action to be taken and a refusal to allow such changes to be brought about unilaterally.[cvi]Since the 19th century, peace conferences and multilateral treaties  havebeenplayingakeyroleinendingofwarsbetweenEuropeanStatesandrelated dispositions of territories. The list of best-known peace conferences and peace      treaties includes: the Congress of Vienna[cvii](1815), the Concert of Europe[cviii](1815- 1848), the Treaty of Paris[cix](1856), the Congress of Berlin (1878), the International Government of Crete (1897-1913),[cx]the Act of Algeciras (1906),[cxi]the Treaty of London (1913) and the creation of Albania[cxii]. Based on these cases, the principle    of consent was established. In general, the dispositions referred to above, though concluded under the aegis of the “Concert of Europe”, were consented to by the   States or other analogous entitiesaffected.

In the cases concerning territorial dispositions, if the Great Powers take dispositive action without assent of “minor” Powers, the validity of the action will be in question. Such a question arose in the case concerning the Jurisdiction of the European Commission of the Danube between Galatz and Braila.[cxiii]The European Commission of the Danube had been established by the Treaty of Paris in 1856       and its jurisdiction was extended to Galatz (Romania) by Article 53 of the 1878   Treaty of Berlin, which also recognized Romania as independent from the Ottoman Empire. (The Ottoman Empire was a party to the Treaty of Berlin, but the Romania was not.) The Commission’s jurisdiction was further extended to Braila by the     Treaty of London of 10 March 1883. However, Romania did not sign this Treaty, neither did take part in the Conference by which it was drawn up.[cxiv]Consequently, article 346 of the Treaty of Versailles reaffirmed the de facto position existing       before the war and this decision was moreover incorporated in the Definitive  Statute of the Danube of 23 July 1921, to which Romania was also a party.[cxv]The Court held that the jurisdiction of the Commission did extend as far as Braila as a matter of interpretation of the treaties of 1919 and 1921 respectively. It did not suggest that the 1883 Treaty of London had that legal effect. As they argued, this   was the case in that despite “the European Commission had exercised some powers on the sector from Galatz to Braila, no matter what the legal ground and nature of these powers may have been”, it did not rely upon Romania’ acquiescence to the Treaty of London as well as it could not bind Romania without its consent.[cxvi]Hence, conclusion can be drawn from this: in light of precedent in 19th century, it is possible to conclude that no State, no matter how authoritative this might be in the world stage of international relations, has the power to unilaterally settle  territorialdisputes.[cxvii]

In consideration of peace treaties as a means of dispositions of war, some exceptional measures may be taken under exceptional circumstances. For instance, defeated aggressor States as parties to a post-war peace treaty, may not be notified of treaty amendments. Nonetheless, the general rule is that any State Party to a treaty shall be included in negotiation and conclusion required by any proposal amendment.[cxviii]This amounts to say that, in international law, even a defeated State has the right to participate in any negotiation concerning its territory. However, China, who was one of the major powers of the Allied Forces, one of the victorious powers and the most war-torn State in World War II, was entirely excluded from the negotiationsconcerningtheTreatyofPeacewithJapanandtheAgreementBetween the United States of America and Japan Concerning the Ryukyu Islands and the    Daito Islands. These two treaties are both manifest indications of legal hegemony claimed by some Great Powers, which is even in conflict with the international law of 19th century, not to mention international lawtoday.

As a matter of fact, the parliamentary procedures of the postwar-established Far Eastern Commission (FEC) were in line with the rule of “majority vote with four powers unanimity”[cxix]among the Soviet Union, the U.S., the UK and China.   Such a principle embodied the concept of multilateralism as opposed to legal hegemony in the disposition of post-war issues. Consisted of representatives  from France, the Netherlands, Australia, Canada, New Zealand, India and the Philippines,[cxx]FEC was charged with the task of implementing policies, principles, and criteria to which Japan would have to fully conform in order to enforce the      terms of its surrender. It was also responsible for the deliberation on any request   from any of its member States, any order issued by the SCAP as well as any action taken by the SCAP that also involved the Commission’s jurisdiction. The U.S. government was responsible for formulating policy directives in accordance to        the resolutions of the FEC while moreover conveying them to the SCAP through appropriate government apparatus. The SCAP was obliged to perform thesedirectives embodying the FEC’sresolutions.

Moreover, albeit in international law is possible for the U.S. to relinquish their administrativerightovermandates,trustterritoriesornon-self-governingterritories, these territories will not nonetheless be reduced to “terra nullius”. And their future status shall be determined by the competent authority assuming the supervision responsibility.[cxxi]Hence, when the U.S.unilaterally decided to relinquish itsadministrative right over the Ryukyu Islands, it could not, at the same time, determine its future status. On the one hand, without the ratification of the United Nations General Assembly or the Security Council, the Ryukyu Islands had not       been officially placed under the UN trusteeship system. Because of this ratification failure, the U.S. had never legitimately qualified as “the administering authority   under the trusteeship system”. Consequently, the Agreement Between the United States of America and Japan Concerning the Ryukyu Islands and the Daito Islands cannot be regarded as an act of relinquishing or assignment of administrative right under the trusteeship system. On the other hand, as a temporary possessor of the administrative right, the U.S. might have relinquished its administrative right over the Ryukyu Islands, which can only be regarded as a non-self-governing territory,  but not to Japan as Japan does not qualify as a competent international authority      that can assume the supervisory responsibility. In conclusion, in order to attain        full legitimacy, the Ryukyu issue should be settled via multilateral settlement mechanism under in accordance to either the provisions of the Treaty of Peace        with Japan or the collective settlement mechanisms of the United Nations. This solution may resemble the settlement scheme elaborated under the United Nations trusteeship system in that the UN General Assembly and the Security Council are entitled to become the competent supervisory authority of the RyukyuIslands.

 

(This article published in China Oceans Law Review, Vol. 2019 No.2, pp.28-71.)

 

 

 

 

Translators: HUANG Yuxin and LIN Fenglai Editor (English): Maria Elena Indelicato



*LUO Huanxin is an associate researcher at the Institute of International Law of Chinese   Academy of Social Sciences. E-mail: luohuanxin@cass.org.cn.©THE AUTHOR AND CHINA OCEANS LAW REVIEW

[1]This article uniformly uses the abbreviation of“Ryukyu”.

[2]In addition, there are Daitō Islands lying 349 kilometers from the Okinawa Island, which     had always been an uninhabited island before the Meiji period and named by Japan with the Ryukyu Islands collectively as the Southwest Islands. Therefore, the Southwest Islandsandthe Ryukyu Islands are also referred to, in general terms, as “  琉 球 Ryukyu”. The English translation of琉球 Ryukyuis now basically unified asRyukyu”. However, in the previoushistoricalgraphicmaterials,“Ryukyu”wastranslatedas“LooChoo”,“LuChoo”,“LooChu”, “LiuKiu”orLewchew”andsoon.TheseEnglishwordsareactuallyderivedfromthe pronunciation of the word “ 琉 球 ” in Chinese. After the World War II, the U.S. military documents and maps used “LooChoo” most to mark the Ryukyu Islands, and the other above-mentioned translations sometimes. The differences in the translation of Ryukyu can   be clearly seen in the compilation of the Ryukyu Studies by Patrick Beillevaire. Patrick Beillevaire ed., Ryukyu Studies to 1854: Western Encounter, London: Curzon Press, 2000.

[3]The Okinawa Prefecture region currently “ruled” by Japan, also known as the Ryukyu         Islands in a narrow sense, mainly includes the Okinawa Islands in the central and the    Sakishima Islands in the south. The Sakishima Islands comprises the Miyako Islands and    the Yaeyama Islands. Japan believes that the Osumi Islands, the Tokara Islands and the     Amami Islands (collectively known as the Satsunan Islands) in the north do not belong         to the historical Ryukyu Kingdom but to the Kagoshima Prefecture. See Public Relations Division, Executive Office of the Governor, Okinawa Prefectural Government, Outline of Okinawa Prefecture 2008. Okinawa: Senden Inc., 2008, p. 1; LUO Huanxin, The Status      of the Ryukyus in International Law,  Chinese Review of International Law, Vol.  1, 2014,   pp. 8~9 (in Chinese); LUO Huanxin, Territorial Status of the Ryukyus and Sovereignty of Diaoyu Islands in International Law, Beijing: China Social Science Press, 2015, p. 60. (in Chinese)

[4]LUO Huanxin, The Status of the Ryukyus in International Law, Chinese Review of International Law, Vol.  1, 2014, pp. 18~23 (in Chinese); LUO Huanxin, Territorial Status of the Ryukyus and Sovereignty of Diaoyu Islands in International Law, Beijing: China  Social Science Press, 2015, pp. 109~155. (in Chinese)

[5]Okinawa, which only accounts for 0.6% of Japan’s land area, bears 75% of the U.S. military bases in Japan. The U.S. military in Okinawa is 65% of the total number of the U.S. Forces in Japan (there are 45,000 U.S. Forces in Japan and Okinawa alone has 29,000 people).       See Masamichi S. Inoue, Okinawa and The U.S. Military: Identity Making in the Age of Globalization, New York: Columbia University Press 2007, p. 2; Morieru Arasaki, Modern Japan and Okinawa, translated by SUN Junyue, Open Times, Vol. 3, 2009, p. 25. (in Chinese)

[6]This uncontroversial self-determination can also be called “external self-determination”,    which is different from the controversial “internal self-determination”. See BAI Guimei, Self-Determination in International Law, Beijing: The Chinese Overseas Publishing House, 1999, p. 8. (in Chinese)

 

[7]UnitedNationsGeneralAssemblyResolution1514(XV)of14December1960.

[8]United Nations General Assembly Resolution1803 (XII) of 14 December 1962.

[9]BAI Guimei, Self-Determination in International Law, Beijing: The Chinese Overseas   Publishing House, 1999, p. 1. (in Chinese)

[10]James Summers, Peoples and International Law, 2nd edn, Leiden: Marinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2014, p.1.

[11]James Summers, Peoples and International Law, 2nd edn, Leiden: Marinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2014, p.30.

[12]BAI Guimei, Self-Determination in International Law, Beijing: The Chinese Overseas Publishing House, 1999, p. 55. (inChinese)

[13]Most Western scholars believe that self-determination invariably implies the right ofcolonial people or oppressed people to establish independent sovereign States, as well as the right to unite or merge into other independent States or political entities. See Yoram Dinstein, Is There a Right to Secede, in ASIL Proceedings of 1996, pp. 299, 302; Jan Klabbers and René Lefeber, Africa: Lost between Self-determination and Uti Possidentis, in Catherine Brolmann et al. eds., Peoples and Minorities in International Law, 1993, p.37; Marcelo G. Kohen, Secession: International Law Perspectives, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006, p.24.

[14]Iris Marion Young, Global Challenges: War, Self-Determination, and Responsibility for Justice, Cambridge: Polity Press, 2007, p.40.

[15] Antonio Cassese, Political Self-determination – Old Concepts and New Development, in Antonio Cassese ed., UN Law, Fundamental Rights: Two Topics in International Law, SijthoffandNoordhoffInternationalPublishers,1979,pp.137~165.

[16]Antonio Cassese, Self-Determination of Peoples: A Legal Reappraisal,Cambridge:Cambridge University Press, 1995, pp. 5~6, 67~90, 101~133; Marc Weller, Escaping the Self-determination Trap, Leiden/Boston: Martinus Nijhoff, 2008, p. 23.

[17]BAI Guimei, Self-Determination in International Law, Beijing: The Chinese Overseas Publishing House, 1999, p. 89. (inChinese)

[18]James Summers, Peoples and International Law: How Nationalism and Self-Determination Shape a Contemporary Law of Nations, Leiden/Boston: Marinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2014, pp. 13~36, 130~178; Antonio Cassese, Self-determination of Peoples: A Legal Reappraisal, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995, pp.11~90.

[19]Antonio Cassese, Self-determination of Peoples: A Legal Reappraisal, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995, p. 71; James R. Crawford, The Creation of States in International Law, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979, p. 101; Andrés Rigo-Sureda, Evolution  of the Right to Self-determination, Leiden: A.W. Sijthoff, 1973, p. 226; Karen Knop, Diversity and Self-Determination in International Law, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002, p. 51; Helen Quane, The United Nations and the Evolving Right to Self- Determination, International and Comparative Law Quarterly, Vol. 1998, No. 3, p. 558; Richard T. De George, The Myth of the Right of Collective Self-Determination, in William Twining ed., Issues of Self-determination, Aberdeen:Aberdeen University Press, 1991, p. 2;James Summers, Peoples and International Law: How Nationalism and Self-Determination Shape a Contemporary Law of Nations, Leiden/Boston: Marinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2014, pp. 137~187, 327; BAI Guimei, Self-Determination in International Law, Beijing: The   Chinese Overseas Publishing House, 1999, pp. 88~103. (in Chinese)

[20]The earliest account about the ancient Ryukyu, “a country without ancient books orrecords”, appeared in The Biography of Ryukyu. See MI Qingyu, Studies on the History of Ryukyu, Tianjin: Tianjin People’s Publishing House, 1998, p. 1 (in Chinese). The record of Ryukyu in Japanese ancient books began with the “Records of the South Island” written by Hakuseki Arai in the 58th year of Emperor Kangxi’s reign (1719). The book quotes the last paragraph of The Biography of Ryukyu: “In the first year of Emperor Daye’s reign … in his third-year reign, Emperor Daye demanded a military officer ZHU Kuan to sail abroad and explore different cultures ... Arriving in Ryukyu, Kuan, due to the communicative difficulty caused by different languages, captured one person and returned. The next year, Emperor Daye sent Kuan back to conciliate the people in Ryukyu; but they turned Kuan down. Kuan returned with their armors. At that time, the envoy of Wo (namely Japan in Chinese) saw     the armors when paying regard to Chinese Emperor and remarked that those armors belong tothepeopleinRyukyu.”SeeMIQingyu,StudiesontheHistoryofRyukyu,Tianjin:Tianjin People’s Publishing House, 1998, p. 2 (in Chinese). Hakuseki Arai contrived to demonstrate that Japan (namely Wo  at that time) had a long history with Ryukyu. Chinese historians believe that it is because Japan “has no reliable record of history, therefore often relied on    the Chinese historical records, to deduce or even forge history sometimes, trying to prove   that there existing a long-standing relationship between Japan and Ryukyu.” See YANG Zhongkui,China,Ryukyu,DiaoyuIslands.HongKong:UnionResearchInstitute,1972,p.7. (inChinese)

[21] JU Deyuan, The Beginning of Japan Purloining Territory – A Debate on the Sovereignty   over Diaoyu Islands. Beijing: Capital Normal University Press, 2001, p. 72, p. 326 (in Chinese);MIQingyu,StudiesontheHistoryofRyukyu,Tianjin:TianjinPeople’sPublishing House, 1998, p. 1. (inChinese)

[22] Kiyoshi Inoue, Diaoyu Islands: History and Sovereignty, translated by JIA Junqi and YU Wei, China Social Sciences Press, 1997, pp. 48~49. (inChinese)

[23]Kiyoshi Inoue, Diaoyu Islands: History and Sovereignty, translated by JIA Junqi and YU Wei, China Social Sciences Press, 1997, p. 46. (in Chinese). Ryukyu Shobun, is also called “Disposition of Ryukyu”. In a narrow sense, it refers to Japan’s abolishment and annexation of the Ryukyu Kingdom to make it Okinawa Prefecture of Japan; in a broad sense, it refers to the whole process during this period. Morieru Arasaki, Modern Japan and Okinawa, translated by SUN Junyue, Open Times, Vol. 3, 2009, p. 47. (in Chinese)

[24]Hersch Lauterpacht ed., Oppenheim’s International Law, translated by WANG Tieya and CHEN Tiqiang, Beijing: The Commercial Press, 1989, p. 55. (inChinese)

[25]Award of the Island of Palmas Case, The American Journal of International Law, Vol. 22, 1928, p. 845; Award of the Island of Palmas (or Miangas) (The United States of America v. The Netherlands), at https://pcacases.com/web/sendAttach/714, p. 14, 15 June2018.

[26]Hersch Lauterpacht ed., Oppenheim’s International Law, translated by WANG Tieya and CHEN Tiqiang, Beijing: The Commercial Press, 1989, pp. 98~100. (inChinese)

[27]Kikoh Nishizatou, Studies on the History of Relations between China, Ryukyu and Japan    in the Late Qing Dynasty, translated by HU Liancheng, Beijing: Social Sciences Academic Press (China), 2010, p. 12. (inChinese).

[28]ZHANG Qixiong, a scholar from Taiwan, also pointed out that Ryukyu is part of Chinese sovereignty in the tributary system. See ZHANG Qixiong, Sovereignty Issue of Diaoyu Islands – the Proof in International Law of Japan’s Claim, Bulletin of the Institute of Modern History, Academia Sinica, Vol. 22 (of 2), 1993 (in Chinese). ZHANG clearly stated on page 110 that “China and Ryukyu (the Suzerain and the vassal State respectively) are the same country”, and Ryukyu “is part of the Empire of China”. Definitely, there were manyvassalStates of China at that time with different degree of autonomy; in comparison, Ryukyu was one of the most loyal and stable vassal States. Due to the theme and length of this paper, the author will not further explore thistopic.

[29]Toshirou Obata, Reflection on the Diaoyu Islands Issue, CHENG Jiarui ed., The Legal Status of the Diaoyu Islands, (Taiwan) Proceedings of the First Symposium on Diaoyu Islands,1997,Taipei:TaiwanSoochowUniversityPress,p.198.

[30]Toshirou Obata, Reflection on the Diaoyu Islands Issue, CHENG Jiarui ed., The Legal Status of the Diaoyu Islands, (Taiwan) Proceedings of the First Symposium on Diaoyu Islands,1997,Taipei:TaiwanSoochowUniversityPress,p.198.

[31]SeethepaintingoftheenvoyandtheconferringboatbyZHOUHuanginthetwenty-first year of Emperor Qianlong’s reign in the Qing Dynasty (1756).

[32]It is worth mentioning that there is a popular theory about “Ryukyu’s affiliation to both governments” in historical science, pointing out that, after Satsuma’s invasion in 1609,    Ryukyu was “affiliated to both governments” of China and Japan and paid tributes to both   at the same time. This statement has no legal significance since the partial “tribute” was nothing but Japan’s aggressive “compulsory trade”. How can the “tribute” forced by Japan   beequivalentwiththetributefromthevassalStateRyukyutotheSuzerainChinawhichhad been peaceable and voluntary in a highly regulated political etiquette for centuries? Is there a conferring ceremony between Japan and Ryukyu as the source of the Ryukyuan King’s legality? Was the “righteousness of the monarch” of Japan recognized by the Ryukyuan   King? The significance of the Sino-Ryukyuan conferring ceremonies will be specifically discussedhereinafter.

[33]Hans-Ulrich Scupin, History of International Law, 1815 to World War I, Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law, at https://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/ law:epil/9780199231690/law-9780199231690-e708?rskey=UE8I9X&result=4&prd=OPIL, paras. 30, 31, 35, 36, 15 June2018.

[34]Occupation refers to the action of a State that consciously acquiring sovereignty over the territoryunderthesovereigntyofnoStateatthetime(i.e.,“terranullius”).Attachment refers to the increase of land through natural or man-made formation. Prescription is a   method of acquiring part of other State’s territory through long, open, and continuous possession and domination of the land.

[35]It is important to note that conquest is also different from merger (also known as “annexation”). Merger often applies to unilateral decisions made by a State in order to expand its territory in the context of internal and external armed conflict. If the unilateral annexation declaration is applied to terra nullius (“nobody’s land”), may suffice effective occupation. If it is a unilateral statement made by the victorious State in the event of an       armed conflict to declare the annexation of enemy State’s lands as a result of act of war, however, such mode of territorial sovereignty transfer is not generally accepted in either traditional international law or contemporary international law. This thus is not a mode of acquiring territory in traditional international law. Malcolm N. Show also points out in his book, International Law, that it is controversial that whether the annexation declaration proposed by a State during the war can lead to the transfer of territorial rights or not. See Malcolm N. Show, International Law, Cambridge: Grotius Publications Limited, 1986, p. 249.

[36]“Conquest only operates as a cause of loss of sovereignty when there is war between two  States and by reason of the defeat of one of them sovereignty over territory passes from the loser to the victorious State”. See Legal Status of Eastern Greenland (Denmark v. Norway), PCIJ Judgment 1933, p.47.

[37]Marcelo G. Kohen, Conquest, Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law, at https://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law-9780199231690-e275?rskey=g6tgDa&result=1&prd=OPIL, para. 7, 15 June 2018. The “peace treaty” here, as an element, is discussed from the perspective of conquest as a mode of acquiring territory. It     is a different case as for regaining lost territory through war instead of “conquering”, such   as China’s recovering of Taiwan after World War II. The author will not further explore this topic due to the length and theme of thispaper.

[38]Marcelo G. Kohen, Conquest, Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law, at https://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law-9780199231690-e275? rskey=g6tgDa&result=1&prd=OPIL,para.7,15June2018.

[39]Hersch Lauterpacht ed., Oppenheim’s International Law, Vol.  II (of 2), Book I, translated   by WANG Tieya and CHEN Tiqiang, Beijing: The Commercial Press, 1989, p. 144. (in Chinese)

[40]Hersch Lauterpacht ed., Oppenheim’s International Law, Vol.  II (of 2), Book I, translated    by WANG Tieya and CHEN Tiqiang, Beijing: The Commercial Press, 1989, p. 145. (in Chinese)

[41]Malcolm N. Shaw, International Law, 5th edn, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003, p. 1040.

[42]Hersch Lauterpacht ed., Oppenheim’s International Law, Vol.  II (of 2), Book I, translated    by WANG Tieya and CHEN Tiqiang, Beijing: The Commercial Press, 1989, p. 181. (in Chinese)

[43]Hersch Lauterpacht ed., Oppenheim’s International Law, Vol. II (of 2), Book I, translated by WANG Tieya and CHEN Tiqiang, Beijing: The Commercial Press, 1989, pp. 147~148. (in Chinese)

[44] Kikoh Nishizatou, Studies on the History of Relations between China, Ryukyu and Japan    in the Late Qing Dynasty, translated by HU Liancheng, Beijing: Social Sciences Academic Press (China), 2010, p. 282. (inChinese)

[45]Oliver Dörr, Cession, Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law, at https://opil. ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law-9780199231690-e1377?rskey=YG kwBy&result=1&prd=OPIL, para. 1, 15 June2018.

[46]Oliver Dörr, Cession, Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law, at https:// opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law-9780199231690-e1377?rske y=YGkwBy&result=1&prd=OPIL, para. 8, 15 June 2018. Meanwhile, there is no limit to    the types of treaties. It can be a formal, written treaty, a memorandum, or in other forms reflecting the true wills of the twoStates.

[47]LI Hongzhang, Drafts of Official Letters to the Office of Foreign Affairs, Vol. 8, pp. 41~44, quoted from JU Deyuan, The Origin and Development of Stolen Territory by Japan –   Sovereignty Dispute over the Diaoyu Islands, Beijing: Capital Normal University Press, 2001, p. 76. (inChinese)

[48]There is controversy about if there was any firm recommendation, but John A. Bingham acknowledged that at least he offered some opinions unofficially when responding toJapan’s consultations. JU Deyuan, The Origin and Development of Stolen Territory by Japan – Sovereignty Dispute over the Diaoyu Islands, Beijing: Capital Normal University Press, 2001, p. 84 (in Chinese). See also Kikoh Nishizatou, Studies on the History of Relations between China, Ryukyu and Japan in the Late Qing Dynasty, translated by HU Liancheng,Beijing:SocialSciencesAcademicPress(China),2010,p.312.(inChinese)

[49]JU Deyuan, The Origin and Development of Stolen Territory by Japan Sovereignty Dispute over the Diaoyu Islands, Beijing: Capital Normal University Press, 2001, p. 82. (in Chinese)

[50]Kikoh Nishizatou, Studies on the History of Relations between China, Ryukyu and Japan    in the Late Qing Dynasty, translated by HU Liancheng, Beijing: Social Sciences Academic Press (China), 2010, p. 299. (inChinese)

[51]Kiyoshi Inoue, On the History and Ownership of Diaoyu Islands, Shanghai: SDX Joint Publishing Company, 1973, p. 16. (inChinese)

[52] Few scholars know about the Sino-Japanese negotiations on the “Case of Islands Division and Treaty Amendment”. The historical materials concerning this case can only be found    in the Historical materials of the Negotiations during Emperor Guangxu’s Reign (Vol. II), Historical Accounts on Diplomacy of Late Qing Dynasty (Vol.  21 and Vol.  25) compiled     by WANG Yufu (i.e., Drafts of the Pact on the Case of the Ryukyu Islands, Drafts of the Additional Treaty), as well as the memorials presented by Minister of Beiyang and Minister of Nanyang to the emperor on the Case of the Ryukyu Islands. JU Deyuan, The Origin and Development of Stolen Territory by Japan – Sovereignty Dispute over the Diaoyu Islands, Beijing: Capital Normal University Press, 2001, p. 96 (in Chinese). Kikoh Nishizatou, Studies on the History of Relations between China, Ryukyu and Japan in the Late Qing   Dynasty, translated by HU Liancheng, Beijing: Social Sciences Academic Press (China),  2010, pp. 299~300. (inChinese)

[53]JU Deyuan, The Origin and Development of Stolen Territory by Japan Sovereignty Dispute over the Diaoyu Islands, Beijing: Capital Normal University Press, 2001, pp.89~95. (inChinese)

[54] Forexample,ChiangKai-shekgaveaspeechinApril1934entitled“TheStatementofJapan and the Way  to Save Our Country”. Chiang further expressed his attitude: “We need to   recoverwhatwehavelost,includingnotonlythefourprovincesinthenortheasternChina.

[55]but also Taiwan and the Ryukyu Islands. These are our territories, and we will take every inch of them back.” Chiang made it clear that the Ryukyu Islands are also territories that Chinese government wanted to recover in the war against aggression. CHEN Zhiqi ed., A Compilation of Historical Materials of the Republic of China on Diplomacy, Vol. 8, Taipei: Bohaitang Culture Co., Ltd., 1996, p. 3349. During the Supreme Defense Conference held   inWuhaninOctober1938afterthebreakoutoftheWarofResistanceagainstJapan,WANG Jingwei once asked FENG Yuxiang what “fighting till the end of the War of Resistance” means. FENG replied: “It means we will keep fighting till we recover all territories we have lost, including the Four Northeastern Provinces, Taiwan and the Ryukyu islands, with unconditional surrender of Imperial Japan as a result.” FENG Yuxiang, Chiang Kai-shek I Have Known, Harbin: Heilongjiang People’s Publishing House, 1980, pp. 94~95. Soong Tse-ven, as Minister of Foreign Affairs of Republic of China, made a clear statement on the “post-war territory” at the first press conference for foreign and domestic journalists held    on 3 November 1942 that “... China shall recover the territories such as Four Northeastern Provinces, the Ryukyu Islands and Taiwan.” Secretariat Library of the Kuomintang Central Executive Committee ed., Edited Archives, No. 13, the version of 17 May of the 32nd year of Republic of China (1943). Quoted from The Keynote Speech on Recovering Taiwan During the War of Resistance Against Japan, in Party History Committee of Kuomintang Central Executive Committee ed., A Compilation of Historical Materials on Modern Chinese History, Taipei: Party History Committee of Kuomintang Central Executive Committee, 1990, p. 99. (inChinese)

[56]Asfortheattitudeoftheinternationalcommunity,theroleoftheformerUSPresidentGrant in mediating the negotiation between China and Ryukyu mentioned above can be taken as  an example that the international community does not recognize Japan’s “Disposition of Ryukyu”. Thereafter, President Roosevelt’s consultation with Chiang Kai-shek before the release of the Cairo Declaration in 1943 about whether to take back the Ryukyu Islands is another example. In addition, in 2012, when the Ryukyuan people complained to the United Nations Human Rights Council against Japan that “Ryukyu Kingdom, which Ryukyuans had founded, was colonized by Japan in 1872, and renamed as ‘Okinawa Prefecture’ in 1879,inviolationofViennaConventionontheLawofTreaties,Article51”,which“procured by the coercion of its representative through acts or threats directed against him shall be  withoutanylegaleffect”.TheAssociationoftheIndigenousPeoplesintheRyukyus(AIPR), an NGO without consultative status, also shares the views expressed in this statement. See Human rights situations that require the Council’s attention:written statement/submitted by the International Movement against All Forms of Discrimination and Racism, UN Doc. A/ HRC/20/NGO/20/Rev.1,athttp://digitallibrary.un.org/record/730447?ln=en,15June2018.

[57] The aforementioned legal analysis about the “Disposition of Ryukyu” can also be found      in LUO Huanxin, Territorial Status of the Ryukyus and Sovereignty of Diaoyu Islands in InternationalLaw,Beijing:ChinaSocialSciencePress,2015,pp.45~52.(inChinese)

[58]British troops consisted largely of Australians. Please see Theodore Cohen, Remaking Japan: The American Occupation as New Deal, NewYork: Free Press, 1987, pp. 58~61.

[59]The four major Allied powers – the U.S., the UK, the Soviet Union, and China – established an Allied Council in Tokyo late in December 1945. In February 1946, a Far Eastern CommissionwasalsoformedinWashington.Itsmembersconsistedof11victoriousnations. Neither the Allied Council nor Far Eastern Commission made any positive impacts in the eyes of MacArthur, the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers. Kenneth G.  Henshall, A History of Japan: From Stone Age to Superpower, 3rd edn, London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012, p. 143

[60]“US Initial Post-Surrender Policy for Japan”, SWNCC 150/4, Record Group 218, National Archives II, College Park,Maryland.

[61]“Detached disposition” for Ryukyu means that the Mikado system, where the Mikado was defined as the symbol of the State of Japan, was not applicable for Ryukyu any longer,  and Ryukyu was placed under direct military authority of the U.S., who acted on behalf of  the Allied Powers. Such a separate arrangement for Ryukyu legally implies that Ryukyu became a “territory detached from enemy states”. Please see LUO Huanxin, The Status of  the Ryukyus in International Law, Chinese Review of International Law, No.1, 2014, pp. 9~19; and, LUO Huanxin: Territorial Status of the Ryukyus and Sovereignty of Diaoyu     Islands in International Law, Beijing: China Social Sciences Press, 2015, pp. 79~96. (in Chinese)

[62]Hersch Lauterpacht ed., Oppenheim’s International Law, Book 1, Vol.  II, translated by   WANG Tieya, CHEN Tiqiang, Beijing: The Commercial Press, 1989, p. 322. (inChinese)

[63]Hersch Lauterpacht ed., Oppenheim’s International Law, Book 1, Vol.  II, translated by   WANG Tieya, CHEN Tiqiang, Beijing: The Commercial Press, 1989, p. 321. (inChinese)

[64]UnitedStatesTreatiesandOtherInternationalAgreements,1952,Vol.3,Part3,p.3169.

[65]LUO Huanxin, Territorial Status of the Ryukyus and Sovereignty of Diaoyu Islands in InternationalLaw,Beijing:ChinaSocialSciencesPress,2015,pp.124~129.(inChinese)

[66]According to the Charter of the United Nations, trusteeship can be categorized as general trusteeship and strategictrusteeship.

[67]According to the Charter of the United Nations, the supervising organs of the trusteeship systemconsistoftheTrusteeshipCouncil,theGeneralAssemblyandtheSecurityCouncil.

 

[68]Art. 3:  “Japan will  concur in  any  proposal of  the  United States to  the  United Nations  to place under its trusteeship system, with the United States as the sole administering        authority, Nansei Shoto south of 29 degree north latitude (including the Ryukyu Islands and theDaitoIslands),NanpoShotosouthofSofuGan(includingtheBoninIslands,RosarioIsland and the Volcano  Islands) and Parece Vela  and Marcus Island. Pending the making of such a proposal and affirmative action thereon, the United States will have the right to exercise all and any powers of administration, legislation and jurisdiction over the territory and inhabitants of these islands, including their territorial waters.” Treaty of Peace with Japan: Signed on 8 September 1951, proclaimed on 28 April 1952. Declaration by Japan, and exchange of notes signed on 8 September 1951. United States Treaties and Other InternationalAgreements,1952Vol.3,Part3,p.3169.

[69]Andriy Melnyk, United Nations Trusteeship System, Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law, at https://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law- 9780199231690-e563?rskey=gs5iMV&result=1&prd=OPIL, para. 12, 15 June2018.

[70]Conference for the Conclusion and Signature of the Treaty of Peace with Japan, San Francisco, California, 4-8 September 1951, Record of Proceedings, Department of State Publication 4392, International Organization and Conference Series II, Far Eastern 3, December 1951, Division of Publications, Office of Public Affairs, 1951, pp. 73, 77~79, 84~86.

[71]Just before or after the signing of the Agreement between the United States of America       and Japan Concerning the Ryukyu Islands and the Daito Islands (or “Okinawa Reversion Agreement”) in 1971, representatives of the U.S. and Japan mentioned the “Residual Sovereignty Theory” respectively, but the Theory then differed strikingly in content though the same in concept with the Dulles’ version. For more details please see LUO Huanxin, Territorial Status of the Ryukyus and Sovereignty of Diaoyu Islands in International Law, Beijing: China Social Sciences Press, 2015, pp. 79~96. (inChinese)

[72]AccordingtoArticle77oftheCharteroftheUnitedNations,thethirdcategoryofterritories that may be placed under trusteeship system are “territories voluntarily placed under the system by States responsible for their administration”. The occurrence of the case is slim, hence it is to be skippedherein.

[73]Some Chinese scholars mistake the Trusteeship Agreement for the Territory of the Pacific Islands, which was approved by the United Nations Security Council in 1947,  as a document that placed Ryukyu under the administration of the U.S. Please see LUO Huanxin, The Status of the Ryukyus in International Law, Chinese Review of International Law, Vol. 2014, No. 1, pp. 22~24 (in Chinese); and LUO Huanxin, Territorial Status of the Ryukyus and Sovereignty of Diaoyu Islands in International Law, Beijing: China Social Sciences Press, 2015, pp. 45~52 (in Chinese). But as a matter of fact, the Pacific Islands, includingMariana,Palau,CarolineandMarshall,placedundertheadministrationofthe U.S. in July of 1947, were the United Nations only Strategic Trust Territory. Although these islands are also located in the Pacific and with the U.S. as the sole administering authority, but actually they don’t consist of the Ryukyu Islands. The above-clarified fact can also        be seen in Oppenheim’s International Law. It is mentioned that the mandated territory actually refers to the Japan-held Pacific islands originally occupied by Germany; and that    the Ryukyus were not the Japan’s mandated territory, but were also disposed as a Trust Territory. See Robert Jennings and Arthur Watts KCMG eds., Oppenheim’s International Law, translated by WANG Tieya, et al., Beijing: Encyclopedia of China Publishing House, Note 428. (inChinese)

[74]AgreementBetweenJapanandtheUnitedStatesofAmericaConcerningtheRyukyuIslands and the Daito Islands, 17 June 1971, Treaties and Other International Agreements of the United States, 1972, Vol. 23, Part 1, 1972, pp.447~574.

[75]Okinawa Reversion Treaty, Senate Executive Report, No. 92~10, 92nd Congress, 1st Session, p.6.

[76]The Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 64, 1971, pp.32~41.

[77]The Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 65, 1971, p.34.

[78]Formoreinformationaboutresidualsovereignty,pleaseseeLUOHuanxin,AHistoricaland Legal Investigation on “Residential Sovereignty” Concerning the Ryukyus Issues, Japanese Studies, 2014, No. 4, pp. 63~81; and LUO Huanxin, Territorial Status of the Ryukyus and Sovereignty of Diaoyu Islands in International Law, Beijing: China Social Sciences Press, 2015, pp. 129~138. (inChinese)

[79]The International Court of Justice ruled in the case of East Timor that the right of peoples    to self-determination has an erga omnes character under customary international law.  See ICJ Report, 1995, pp. 90, 102. See also Robert Jennings and Arthur Watts KCMG eds., Oppenheim’s International Law, translated by WANG Tieya, et al., Beijing: Encyclopedia of China Publishing House, 1998, p. 5 (in Chinese). Support for the opinion that self- determination is a jus cogens rule can be commonly seen in all kinds of statements pertinentto international law.

[80]To know more about the question concerning invalidity of an entire treaty, please see WAN Exiang, et al., International Law of Treaties, Wuhan: Wuhan University Press, 1998, pp. 281, 394. (inChinese)

[81]Matthew Allen, Identity and Resistance in Okinawa, New York: Rowman & Littlefield Publisher, 2002, p.33.

[82]Miyume Tanji, Myth, Protest and Struggle in Okinawa, London: Routledge, 2006, pp. 36~38.

[83]Michael S. Molasky, The American Occupation of Japan and Okinawa: Literature and Memory, London: Routledge, 1999, pp. 15~17; Matthew Allen, Identity and Resistance in Okinawa, pp. 38~45; Masahide Ota, Okinawa: Senso to Heiwa (Okinawa, War andPeace), p. 39, pp. 92~96; Miyume Tanji, Myth, Protest and Struggle in Okinawa, p. 39. For more about what sufferings the Ryukyuan people have gone through, please see LUO Huanxin, The Status of the Ryukyus in International Law, Chinese Review of International Law, No.  1, 2014, pp. 8~9 (in Chinese); and LUO Huanxin, Territorial Status of the Ryukyus and Sovereignty of Diaoyu Islands in International Law, Beijing: China Social Sciences Press, 2015, pp. 64~70. (in Chinese)

[84]MorieruArasaki,ModernJapanandOkinawa,translatedbySUNJunyue,OpenTimes,No.3, 2009, p. 33. (inChinese)

[85]Michael S. Molasky, The American Occupation of Japan and Okinawa: Literature and Memory, London: Routledge, 1999, p.20.

[86]Flag of the Independent State of Okinawa. The proposed flag representing Okinawa was announced in January 1950, but never widely used. At http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_ States_Civil_Administration_of_the_Ryukyu_Islands,15June2018.

[88] Due to limited space, the paper does not discuss about the content of the letter. Source:   Britain’sNationalArchives.

[lxxxix]Information Office of State Department of the Republic of China, Vol. 74 of the BookSeriesedited by the Information Office of State Department: The Ryukyus, 1947, p. 18.

[xc] Protest against Some Benighted Japanese, Ryukyu Independence Movement Archives, at http://www.bekkoame.ne.jp/i/a-001/index.html, 15 June 2018. (inJapanese)

[xci] UNGA Resolution 63 (I) of 13 December 1946, “Approval of Trusteeship Agreements”, GAOR 1st Session: Cameroons (the former  mandate  of  British  Cameroons), Togoland (the former British Togoland) and Tanganyika, all three being under UK administration; Cameroons (the former mandate of French Cameroons) and Togoland (French Togoland), both administered by France; Ruanda-Urundi (administered by Belgium); Western Samoa (administered by New Zealand); and New Guinea (administered by Australia). Andriy Melnyk, United Nations Trusteeship System, para. 10, Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law, at https://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law- 9780199231690-e563?rskey=Ck7zyj&result=1&prd=OPIL, 15 June2018.

[xcii] UNGAResolution1044(XI)of13December1956,“TheFutureofTogolandUnderBritish Administration”,GAOR11thSession,SupplementNo.17,p.24.

[xciii]UNGAResolution1416(XIV)of5December1959,“DateoftheIndependenceoftheTrust Territory of Togoland under French Administration”, GAOR 14th Session, Supplement No. 16, p. 32.

[xciv]UNGA Resolution 1349 (XIII) of 13 March 1959, “The Future of the Trust Territory of the CameroonsunderFrenchAdministration”,GAOR13thSession,SupplementNo.18,Vol.1, p. 1.

[xcv]UNGA Resolution 1418 (XIV) of 5 December 1959, “Date of the Independence of the Trust Territory of Somaliland under Italian Administration”, GAOR 14th Session, Supplement No. 16, p.33.

[xcvi]UNGA Resolution 1608 (XV) of 21 April 1961, “The Future of the Trust Territory of the Cameroons under United Kingdom Administration”, GAOR 15th Session, Supplement No. 16, Vol. 2, p.10.

[xcvii]UNGA Resolution 1609 (XV) of 21 April 1961, “The Future of Tanganyika”, GAOR 15th Session, Supplement No. 16, Vol. 2, p. 11; UNGA Resolution 1642 (XVI) of 6 November 1961,“TheFutureofTanganyika”,GAOR16thSession,SupplementNo.17,Vol.1,p.34.

[xcviii]UNGA Resolution 1626 (XVI) of 18 October 1961, “The Future of Western Samoa”,GAOR 16th Session, Supplement No. 17, Vol. 1, p.33.

[xcix]Treaty of Friendship between the Government of New Zealand and the Government of Western Samoa, 453 United Nations Treaty Series 3, signed and entered into force on 1 August1962.

[c]UNGA Resolution 2347 (XXII) of 19 December 1967, “Question of the Trust Territory of Nauru”, GAOR 22nd Session, Supplement No. 16, p.50.

[ci]UNGA Resolution 3284 (XXIX) of 13 December 1974,“Question of Papua New Guinea”, GAOR 29th Session, Supplement No. 31, Vol. 1, p.97.

[cii]UNSC Resolution 683 (1990) of 22 December1990.

[ciii]UNSC Resolution 956 (1994) of 10 November 1994.

[civ]“Statement by ROC ‘Foreign Ministry’ Spokesman on 21 November 1979” in Contemporary Practices and Judicial Decisions of the ROC Relating to International  Law”, Chinese Year book of International Law and Affairs, Vol. 1, 1981, p.151.

 

[cv] David Bederman, The 1871 London Declaration, Rebus Sic Stantibus and a Primitivist    View of the Law of Nations, The American Journal of International Law, pp.1~40.

[cvi] James R. Crawford, The Creation of States in International Law, New York: Oxford University Press, 2007, p.505.

[cvii]Harold Nicolson, The Congress of Vienna, in Paul Schroeder ed., The Transformation of European Politics 1763-1848, New York: Claredon Press, 1994, pp.517~582.

[cviii]Paul Schroeder, The Transformation of European Politics 1763-1848, New York: Clarendon Press, 1994, pp.583~894.

[cix]BritishDeclarationoftheCausesofWaragainstRussia,28March1854,46BFSP,p.33. For the five Ancillary Conventions annexed to the Treaty of Paris, see 46 BFSP, pp.18~26.

[cx] For the Provisional Statue of 1897 and Subsequent Constitutions of 1899 and 1907, see   PCIJ Series C, No. 82, pp. 82~131, Chapter8.

[cxi] ActofAlgeciras,7April1906,99BFSP141,Chapter7.

[cxii]MéirYdit, Internationalised Territories: A Study in the Historical Development of a Modern Notion in International Law and International Relations (1815-1960), Fribourg: L&Université de Fribourg, 1961, pp.29~33.

[cxiii]JurisdictionoftheEuropeanCommissionoftheDanubebetweenGalatzandBraila,PCIJ Series B 1927, No. 14.

[cxiv]PCIJ Series B 1927, No. 14, p.11.

[cxv]114 BFSP 535, Articles V,VI.

[cxvi]PCIJ Series B 1927, No. 14, p.27.

[cxvii]James R. Crawford, The Creation of States in International Law, New York: Oxford University Press, 2007, p.505.

[cxviii]WANExiang,etal.,InternationalLawofTreaties,Wuhan:WuhanUniversityPress,1998,p. 275. (in Chinese)

[cxix]U.S. Treaties and Other International Acts Series 1555; 60 United States Statutes at Large, 1899, 1901-1905; 20 United Nations Treaty Series 259, 276~280, 282~286; A Decade of American Foreign Policy: Basic Documents, 1941-49 (1950), S. Doc. 123, 81st Congress, 1st Session, pp. 58~59, 60~61,62~63.

[cxx]Foreign Ministers of the Soviet Union, the UK and the U.S., met at the Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers during 16-26 December 1945. The establishment of the Far Eastern Commission and the Allied Council based on the agreement of China, was decided at the end of the Conference on 27 December1945.

[cxxi]Marcelo G. Kohen and Mamadou Hébié, Territory Acquisition, Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law, at https://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/ law:epil/9780199231690/law-9780199231690-e1118?rskey=vCg0Yi&result=2&prd=OP IL, para. 6, 15 June2018.